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DDA 85-3152 11 September 1985

NOTE FOR: Director of Training and Education

SUBJECT: Soviet Affairs Training Program

Stan,

I like it! Let's charge forward.

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uatry E. Frezwater

Attachment

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DDA/HEFitzwater:rf (11 Sept 85) Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

1 - DDA Subject (w/att)

1 - DDA Chrono (w/o/att)1 - HEF Chrono (w/o/att)

Herry Gater liked the
Paper.
The Sot copyin
to Claire & Evan.

With their chop back yours - u so formed

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OTE 85-6717

	MEMORAND	om for:	Director of Central Intelli	gence			
	VIA:		Deputy Director of Central Executive Director Deputy Director for Adminis	•			
25X1	FROM:		Director of Training and Ed	ucation .			
	SUBJECT:		Soviet Affairs Training Pro	gram			
	REFERENCE	Ε:	Memo for DDA, DDI, DDO, DDS dtd 7 August 85, same subject	&T, D/OTE fm DCI,			
25 X 1-	l. Soviet Ai	fairs Tr atives (commendations regarding a ng group consisting of and oug MacEachin), and DS&T				
73V I		and the	NIO/USSR.				
	2. The working group strongly agrees that the Agency generally—and especially the junior and mid-level officers working directly on the USSRwould benefit greatly from a first-rate Soviet Affairs Training Program. The program would consist of:						
	four to five one- to two-week courses;						
	10 - 15 specialized modules;						
	luncheon/evening seminars;						
		video/	self-study.				
	3.	Objectiv	<u>res</u>				
	program a	The working group agreed that the principal objectives of the are to:					
	whos limi	e academ	up to speed quickly officers ic or professional backgroun	who work on the USSR but ad on the Soviet Union is			
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- —strengthen the understanding of Soviet specialists in areas not of their specialty, with emphasis on Soviet active measures, deception, and intelligence operations;
- -strengthen the understanding of the totality of the Soviet Union as a political problem for the U.S. and as the first priority intelligence issue for CIA;
 - -challenge and enrich the perspectives of Soviet specialists;
- —build a stronger sense of community among Soviet analysts and collectors;
- -strengthen the understanding of the USSR on the part of non-Soviet analysts and collectors.

4. Operating Bias

The working group agreed that the content and methods of delivery must meet schedules of busy officers, many of whom are overseas. This means:

- -courses should be as short as possible;
- --stand-alone modules;
- -tape and video-disc presentations, especially for overseas use;
- -direct overseas offering;
- --self-study.

In addition:

- -emphasis on "real world" Soviet behavior and on current and near term (1 3 years) Soviet intelligence issues;
 - -maximize exposure to different perpectives on USSR;
 - --maximize challenge to conventional thinking on USSR.

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5. Target Audience

The mid-level of:	program would be ficers working professional	rimarily on	the USSR.	The Agency	has some	
issues,						\neg
			A	dditional nu	mbers wou	Id

come from the ranks of non-Soviet specialists who have a need for some general or specialized understanding of Soviet policies or operations.

6. Courses

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25X1 25X1 An overview course of about 40 hours would be designed to warrant that participants are exposed to an introductory understanding of the full range of issues. The course would go beyond substance and address the issues of the limits to our knowledge, that is,

7. Modules

A major part of the Soviet training program would consist of about 10 - 15 specialized modules. Among the topics under consideration are:

- The Soviet Union as an Intelligence Target
- Soviet Active Measures
- Soviet Measures for Deception
- Soviets and Arms Control
- Soviet Economics
- Kremlin Politics

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- Soviet Military Strategy and Doctrine
- Soviets in the Third World
- Scientific and Technical Trends
- Security and Intelligence Operations

8. Seminars

A coordinated series of luncheon and evening seminars would be designed to complement the program by exposing Agency officers to the full range of competing interpretations on key aspects of the modular courses. In addition to academics and members of research institutions, the guest speakers would include policy officials, Congress members, businessmen, defectors, and emigres.

9. Program Director and Staff

The working group is unanimous in its recommendation that a DO officer, either current or retired, direct all aspects of the proposed Soviet Affairs Study Program. We have a list of retired SE officers and have already been in touch with a couple of excellent candidates (see Attachment A). (Incidentally, there is very strong support for this effort on the part of every Soviet specialist we have talked to.)

10. We have developed a list of Soviet hands in CIA who would be willing to help with incidental parts of the program (see Attachment B). A similar list of outside experts is being developed (see Attachment C).

11. Issues

The working group believes strongly that some elements of the program should be required of all Soviet specialists. For example, you could mandate that all Soviet specialists must take at least two modules per year or that all new Soviet specialists take the overview course within two years of their assignment. The details can be worked out, but we need your views on the question of what, if anything, is "required."

-Yes, some	e elements	should be required	
No, we do	o not need	to make any aspect required	
Let the	individual	Directorates decide	

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12. We request your approval to proceed with the development of the program. If you concur on the general approach, we will be back to you in 45 days with an action plan for implementing the first phase.

Attachments		
CC: NIO/USSR D/SOVA C/SE C/CDS/DS&T		
CONCUR:		
Deputy Director for Administration	Date	
Executive Director	Date	
Deputy Director of Central Intellige APPROVED:	ence Date	
Director of Central Intelligence	Date	

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ATTACH ENT A

Soviet Affairs Training Program—List of Potential Agency Instructors

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Overview of SE Operations The Soviet Target Abroad Active Measures; Deception; Disinformation Soviet Intelligence Services The Soviet Mentality; Political; Economic Soviet Military; S&T Soviet Military Political and Economic Political, Economic, and Military Theater Forces Politico-economic policy and internal politics Politico-economic policy and internal politics Soviet economics Soviet economics Soviet economics

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ATTACHMENT C

LIST OF POTENTIAL PROGRAM DIRECTORS

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